Estimating stranded coal assets in China's power sector

China has suffered overcapacity in coal power since 2016. With growing electricity demand and an economic crisis due to the Covid-19 pandemic, China faces a dilemma between easing restrictive policies for short-term growth in coal-fired power production and keeping restrictions in place for long-term sustainability. In this paper, we measure the risks faced by China's coal power units to become stranded in the next decade and estimate the associated economic costs for different shareholders. By implementing restrictive policies on coal power expansion, China can avoid 90% of stranded coal assets by 2025.

Estimating the Employment and Fiscal Consequences of Thermal Coal Phase-Out in China

China hosts over half of global coal-fired power generation capacity and has the world’s largest coal reserves. Its 2060 carbon neutrality goal will require coal-fired electricity generation to shrink dramatically, with or without carbon capture and storage technology. Two macroeconomic areas in which the socioeconomic impact of this decline is felt are losses in jobs and tax revenues supported by thermal coal mining, transport and power generation. At the national level, under a ‘baseline’ (B) scenario consistent with China’s carbon neutrality goal, labour productivity growth in coal mining implies that significant job losses will occur nationally in the medium term, even if all coal plants continue operating as planned. Jobs supported by the coal power industry would decline from an estimated 2.7 million in 2021, to 1.44 million in 2035 and 94,000 in 2050, with jobs losses from mining alone expected to exceed 1.1 million by 2035. Tax revenues from thermal coal would total approximately CNY 300 billion annually from 2021–2030, peaking in 2023 at CNY 340 billion. This is significantly less than estimated subsidies of at least CNY 480 billion, suggesting coal is likely a net fiscal drain on China’s public finances, even without accounting for the costs of local pollution and the social cost of carbon. As coal plant retirements accelerate, from 2034 onwards, fiscal revenues begin to fall more rapidly, with rates of decline rising from 1% in the 2020s to over 10% a year by the 2040s. More aggressive climate policy and technology scenarios bring job and tax losses forward in time, while a No Transition policy, in which all currently planned coal plants are built, delays but does not ultimately prevent these losses. At the provincial level, China’s major coal-producing provinces will likely face challenges in managing the localised effects of expected job losses and finding productive alternative uses for this labour. Governments of coal-producing provinces like Inner Mongolia, with an industry highly dependent on exports to other provinces, are more exposed than others to declining tax revenues from coal, and more insulated from job losses, given their high current degree of labour efficiency. Although their provincial revenues are likely to remain stable until the early 2030s under the B scenario, the possibility of increasing policy stringency underlines the need for revenue and skill base diversification. At the firm level, China’s ‘Big Five’ state-owned power companies were responsible for over 40% of both jobs and tax revenues in 2021. The number of jobs supported by the activities of each of the largest ten firms, with one exception, will decline by 71–84% by the early 2040s, with the tax contribution of each declining by 43–69% in the same period.

Analysis of efficacy of intervention strategies for COVID-19 transmission: A case study of Hong Kong.

By the end of February 2021, COVID-19 had spread to over 230 countries, with more than 100 million confirmed cases and 2.5 million deaths. To control infection spread with the least disruption to economic and societal activities, it is crucial to implement the various interventions effectively. In this study, we developed an agent-based SEIR model, using real demographic and geographic data from Hong Kong, to analyse the efficiency of various intervention strategies in preventing infection by the SARS-CoV-2 virus. Close contact route including short-range airborne is considered as the main transmission routes for COVID-19 spread. Contact tracing is not that useful if all other interventions have been fully deployed. The number of infected individuals could be halved if people reduced their close contact rate by 25%. For reducing transmission, students should be prioritized for vaccination rather than retired older people and preschool aged children. Home isolation, and taking the nucleic acid test (NAT) as soon as possible after symptom onset, are much more effective interventions than wearing masks in public places. Temperature screening in public places only disrupted the infection spread by a small amount when other interventions have been fully implemented. Our results may be useful for other highly populated cities, when choosing their intervention strategies to prevent outbreaks of COVID-19 and similar diseases.

Evidence for lack of transmission by close contact and surface touch in a restaurant outbreak of COVID-19.

BACKGROUND: Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) is primarily a respiratory disease that has become a global pandemic. Close contact plays an important role in infection spread, while fomite may also be a possible transmission route. Research during the COVID-19 pandemic has identified long-range airborne transmission as one of the important transmission routes although lack solid evidence. METHODS: We examined video data related to a restaurant associated COVID-19 outbreak in Guangzhou. We observed more than 40,000 surface touches and 13,000 episodes of close contacts in the restaurant during the entire lunch duration. These data allowed us to analyse infection risk via both the fomite and close contact routes. RESULTS: There is no significant correlation between the infection risk via both fomite and close contact routes among those who were not family members of the index case. We can thus rule out virus transmission via fomite contact and interpersonal close contact routes in the Guangzhou restaurant outbreak. The absence of a fomite route agrees with the COVID-19 literature. CONCLUSIONS: These results provide indirect evidence for the long-range airborne route dominating SARS-CoV-2 transmission in the restaurant. We note that the restaurant was poorly ventilated, allowing for increasing airborne SARS-CoV-2 concentration.